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Despite the impressive amount of evidence showing involvement of the sensorimotor
systems in language processing, important questions remain unsolved among which
the relationship between non-literal uses of language and sensorimotor activation. The
literature did not yet provide a univocal answer on whether the comprehension of
non-literal, abstract motion sentences engages the same neural networks recruited for
literal sentences. A previous TMS study using the same experimental materials of the
present study showed activation for literal, fictive and metaphoric motion sentences but
not for idiomatic ones. To evaluate whether this may depend on insufficient time for
elaborating the idiomatic meaning, we conducted a behavioral experiment that used
a sensibility judgment task performed by pressing a button either with a hand finger
or with a foot. Motor activation is known to be sensitive to the action-congruency of
the effector used for responding. Therefore, all other things being equal, significant
differences between response emitted with an action-congruent or incongruent effector
(foot vs. hand) may be attributed to motor activation. Foot-related action verbs were
embedded in sentences conveying literal motion, fictive motion, metaphoric motion or
idiomatic motion. Mental sentences were employed as a control condition. foot responses
were significantly faster than finger responses but only in literal motion sentences. We
hypothesize that motor activation may arise in early phases of comprehension processes
(i.e., upon reading the verb) for then decaying as a function of the strength of the semantic
motion component of the verb.
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INTRODUCTION
A consistent bulk of evidence showed that the motor schemata
associated with action words are embedded in the corre-
sponding cortical representations (for overviews, see Mahon
and Caramazza, 2005, 2008; Pulvermüller, 2005; Willems and
Hagoort, 2007; Kemmerer and Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010). The
neural architecture of language-induced motor resonance would
therefore comprise regions encoding information that reflects the
sensory-motor properties associated with the underlying con-
cept. Motor and premotor sites engaged in the production of
actions would also be involved in the comprehension of action-
related words and sentences in somatotopically consistent ways
(Hauk and Pulvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller et al., 2005, 2009;
Tettamanti et al., 2005; but see Fernandino and Iacoboni, 2010;
Boulenger et al., 2012). In sum, word and sentence processing
would be grounded in the brain systems that underlie action and
perception (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Pulvermüller, 2005).
However, despite the impressive, and hard to summarize,
amount of studies that favors the composite Embodied and
Grounded Cognition approach (for overviews, see Mahon and
Caramazza, 2005, 2008; Borghi and Cimatti, 2010; Pulvermüller
and Fadiga, 2010; Weiskopf, 2010; Dove, 2011; Willems and
Casasanto, 2011) important questions remain unsolved. For
instance, it is still disputed whether motor activation arises
in early phases of language comprehension (Pulvermüller,
2005; Zwaan and Taylor, 2006; Kaschak and Borreggine, 2008;
Boulenger et al., 2012), due to automatic activation of the same
neural circuitry for action and language-mediated action simu-
lation, or later on (Boulenger et al., 2009; Papeo et al., 2009)
reflecting late merging of information pertaining to the seman-
tic and action systems (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). Then,
although many studies showed that motor systems become active
when action-related words are comprehended, it still remains
unclear whether motor systems activation is necessary for under-
standing those words when presented in isolation or in linguistic
contexts (for a discussion, see Mahon and Caramazza, 2008;
Shebani and Pulvermüller, 2013). As Willems and Casasanto
(2011) recently put it, the available evidence weights against the
view that merely perceiving a perception or action word necessarily
activates perceptuo-motor areas (Pulvermüller, 2005) while show-
ing that these areas can be activated (p. 7). Turning now to the
problem at issue in the present study, it is still debated the extent
to which the comprehension of non-literal motion sentences
engages the same neural networks recruited when motion is con-
veyed by literal language (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Chen et al.,
2008; Boulenger et al., 2009, 2012; Cacciari et al., 2011; Desai
et al., 2011). Typically, non-literal sentences containing action-
related verbs convey abstract meanings. For instance, when some-
one saysThe employee runs the risk of being fired, orThe rumor flew
across town, it is evident that she did not refer to concrete actions.
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Explaining abstract meanings in terms of embodied/grounded
cognition has become particularly challenging: Abstract concepts
pose a classic challenge for grounded cognition. How can theories
that focus on modal simulation explain concepts that do not appear
modal? (Barsalou, 2008, 634). One possibility is to assume, as
Barsalou (2008) recently suggested that linguistic information
may bemore relevant for abstract than for concrete concepts. This
would lead to a dual system (embodied for concrete meanings
and disembodied for abstract domains), a claim that recently has
been extensively discussed also because of its resemblance with
the Dual Code theory proposed decades ago by Paivio (1986)
(for a discussion, see Kousta et al., 2010; Borghi et al., 2011;
Dove, 2011; Willems and Casasanto, 2011). One way to recon-
cile the embodied and disembodied views on linguistic meanings
is to assume the existence of multiple representations associated
to words originating from perception/action, social and linguis-
tic domains (Borghi and Cimatti, 2010, p. 2): similarly to real
tools, words can be considered as instruments to act in social words,
thus as social words. (. . .) due to a different acquisition process,
the role played by actions performed through words—by linguistic
information—is more relevant for abstract than for concrete words.
Along similar lines, Kousta et al. (2010) proposed that concrete
and abstract concepts may bind different types of information:
experiential information (sensory, motor, and affective) and also
linguistic information. While sensory-motor information would
be more preponderant for concrete concepts, affective informa-
tion would play a greater role for abstract concepts. In sum,
claiming that abstract words may be predominantly processed in
the language system and concrete words in sensory-motor sys-
tems to a larger extent (e.g., Kousta et al., 2010; Borghi et al.,
2011; Scorolli et al., 2011) would confirm that our concepts are
not merely couched in sensorimotor representations but also in lin-
guistic representations (words, phrases, sentences). (Dove, 2011, 7).
The idea that perception-action, linguistic and social information
are more relevant for abstract than for concrete words mitigates,
if not disconfirms, one the tenets of the Embodied view that
all cognition is grounded in bodily states, modal simulations
and situated actions (for a discussion, see Borghi and Cimatti,
2010; Kousta et al., 2010; Dove, 2011; Willems and Casasanto,
2011).
Motion verbs can be used in different ways that depend on the
linguistic information surrounding the action verb. For instance,
in The man runs in the beautiful country the motion verb conveys
an actual change of location of an animate subject. In contrast,
in The road runs along the impetuous river there is no reference
to a physical entity moving: this sentence in fact conveys a fictive
motion (Talmy, 2000). Typically, fictive motion sentences express
a spatial relation between a path (or linear event) and a landmark
(Talmy, 2000; Matlock, 2004; Wallentin et al., 2005; Richardson
and Matlock, 2007). An inanimate subject (e.g., road, railway) is
coupled with a motion verb to convey a static meaning. Are fic-
tive sentences literal or figurative statements? As Jackendoff and
Aaron (1991) claimed, fictive motion sentences are one way to
ordinarily refer to space or locations: there is no way to express spa-
tial extent other than by using such expressions. . . . virtually all the
extent verbs of English can also be used as motion verbs (p. 329). A
simple test may further clarify the issue: while it would be odd to
sayMetaphorically speaking, the road goes from Los Angeles to New
Mexico, it makes perfect sense to say Metaphorically speaking, the
woman runs with her fantasy often. Hence, following Jackendoff
and Aaron, we propose to consider fictive sentences as literal
rather than figurative statements. Motion verbs can be used in
two further ways: they can be inserted in metaphorical statements
as, for instance, in The rumor flew across town, or The woman
runs with her fantasy often. In these cases motion verbs do not
take their default argument in the subject or object position. In
the metaphorical sense, motion verbs are used at a higher level
of abstraction to refer to any instance of goal-driven conjoint
motion. In this view, the metaphorical use of a motion verb pre-
serves the semantic component of motion (Torreano et al., 2005;
Cacciari et al., 2010, 2011). Lastly, a motion verb can be part of an
idiom string as, for instance, in The new employee walks the chalk
line, or Between the neighbors runs bad blood. While literal motion
sentences convey an actual movement and metaphorical sen-
tences an abstract motion, in idiom strings the semantic motion
component of the verb typically vanishes because of the con-
ventionality, arbitrariness of the relationship between the idiom
constituent words and the global figurative meaning.
The picture on the involvement of motor regions in the com-
prehension of action verbs that convey actual or abstract actions
is rather complex. In what follows, we briefly examine the studies
that shed more light on this issue. In the study that led Glenberg
and colleagues to propose the Action Compatibility Effect (ACE,
Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg et al., 2008), participants
judged whether a sentence was or not meaningful (sentence sensi-
bility task) when the meaning conveyed the transfer of a concrete
object or abstract information. Reaction times were faster when
the action conveyed by the sentence matched the action required
to respond in both concrete and abstract sentences. Turning to
TMS studies, Oliveri et al. (2004) showed that action-related verbs
and nouns elicited greater activation in the primary motor cortex
than non-actions stimuli. Differently, Buccino et al. (2005) and
Glenberg et al. (2008) observed motor excitability without any
difference between abstract and action-related sentences. Other
studies obtained different if not opposite findings: Papeo et al.’s
study (2009) showed no specific involvement of the left primary
motor cortex in early and mid time windows (i.e., 170 and 350ms
after stimulus presentations) but only later on, namely 500ms
after presentation of hand-action verbs. The literature highlighted
the presence of further constraints on motor excitability. For
instance, in Papeo et al. (2011) motor cortex was found active
when hand-related action verbs were expressed in first person
but less so, or not at all, with a third person form. Tomasino
et al. (2007) observed activation of M1 only when participants
were explicitly asked to perform an explicit mental simulation
of the verb content. In Cacciari et al. (2011) the literal or non-
literal context in which motion verbs occurred modulated motor
excitability: in fact the MEPs response was largest with literal sen-
tences, followed by fictive sentences and metaphorical motion
sentences. No motor excitability occurred in idiomatic sentences
disconfirming Boulenger et al.’s (2009) claim of activation of
motor cortices for idiomatic sentences. However, in Boulenger
et al.’s fMRI study motor activation occurred at a time window
later than that of the TMS stimulation in Cacciari et al. (2011; see
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also Papeo et al., 2009). Finally, in Cacciari et al. (2010) motor
sentence fragments (formed by a NP followed by a motion verbs)
elicited a significant change in theMEPs amplitude but only when
the sentential subject was animate (i.e., in The lady runs but not
in The highway runs).
Several fMRI studies were conducted as well to elucidate
the neural links between language and action systems. But
again, the resulting picture is far from homogenous (e.g.,
Tettamanti et al., 2005; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Tomasino et al.,
2007; Bedny et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2008; Boulenger et al., 2009;
Raposo et al., 2009; Fernandino and Iacoboni, 2010; Bedny and
Caramazza, 2011). A recent MEG study of Boulenger et al. (2012)
seems to provide evidence of an early automatic activation of
motor areas for idiomatic as well as literal sentences. Very early on
(i.e., 150–250ms after the final literal/idiomatic disambiguating
word) brain regions as the temporal pole, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and Broca’s region were found to be differentially acti-
vated by literal and idiomatic sentences. Early activation in the
motor system at the same early latencies (150–250ms onward)
suggested that motor schemata were activated regardless of the
idiomatic or literal nature of the sentence. However, many of the
idiom strings also had a plain literal meaning, therefore one has
to assume that meaning dominance led participants to interpret
ambiguous idiom strings as idiomatic rather than literal, which
cannot be taken for granted. Then, the extremely scarce presence
of non-action sentences, together with a 50% of idiomatic sen-
tences, may have led participants to develop specific processing
strategies.
In the present study we further explored the presence of
motor activation in the comprehension of literal and non-literal
sentences containing motion verbs. We used a behavioral task
(sensibility judgment) used in many previous studies and the
same set of controlled literal, metaphorical, idiomatic, fictive
motion sentences and mental sentences of the TMS study above
mentioned (Cacciari et al., 2011). In contrast with recent evi-
dence (Boulenger et al., 2009, 2012) but consistently with, for
instance, Raposo et al. (2009) and Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2006),
in Cacciari et al. (2011) we did not observe motor activa-
tion for idiomatic sentences. This lack of motor activation in
idiomatic motion sentences was attributed to the fact that when
the motion verb is embedded in an idiom string, it loses any
perceivable semantic trace of action because of the arbitrary
relationships between literal and idiomatic meaning. Differently
from idioms, metaphors maintain the original meaning of the
constituent words and, more importantly motion, they preserve
the motion component of the verb as literal sentences: in both
cases a motion is implied, but in the metaphorical sense the
motion verb is used at a higher level of abstraction to refer
to any instance of goal-driven conjoint motion. Despite the
fact that many idioms originate from metaphors, this origin
is often lost and unperceived by readers. As Aziz-Zadeh et al.
(2006) noted, it is possible that once a metaphor is learned, it
no longer activates the same network that it may have initially.
That is, although a metaphor like “grasping the situation” when
first encountered may have utilized motor representations for its
understanding, once it is overlearned it no longer relies on those
representations.
However, there may be alternative ways for explaining the lack
of motor activation in idiomatic sentences. To begin with, in
our TMS study the sentences were presented in three separate
segments: first the noun phrase, then the verb, and finally the
sentence completion that clarified the literal vs. figurative nature
of the sentence (e.g., Diego/cammina/sul filo del rasoio spesso/,
Diego/walks/on the edge of the razor often/). This raises the possi-
bility that participants may not have had time enough to revise the
literal interpretation assigned to the first two parts of the sentence
and to process the idiomatic meaning of the sentence prior to the
TMS stimulation (occurring just at the end of the sentence). As
Boulenger et al. (2012) noted, while the semantic space explored
while comprehending literal sentences is narrower, it can be more
demanding for idiomatic sentences as a wider semantic space has
to be searched. Moreover, idiom comprehension requires at the
same time compositional and non-compositional processing: in
fact idioms are understood by composing the ordinary meanings
of the words until the idiomatic nature of the string is recognized,
then the corresponding idiom configuration is retrieved from
semantic memory and its meaning integrated in the sentential
meaning (Cacciari and Tabossi, 1988). Hence processing idioms
may be more resource and time consuming than corresponding
literal sentences.
To explore the potential effects of these factors, we designed
the present study in which participants judged the sensibility (i.e.,
meaningfulness) of the same sentences used in the TMS study but
presented in their full form and without a time limit. Participants
judged sentence sensibility pressing a button with a hand finger
or with a foot (action-congruent vs. incongruent effector). Motor
activation is known to be sensitive to the action-congruency of
the effector used for responding (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002).
As de Lafuente and Romo (2004) put it, reading words conveying
foot-based motion may make the motor homunculus move its feet.
All other things being equal, any significant difference between
the responses emitted with an action-congruent vs. action-
incongruent effector (in our case, foot vs. hand) may be inter-
preted as implying motor activation. We used leg-related motor
verbs. It would have been interesting to also use hand-related
verbs in order to have the ideal symmetric case. However, this
was impossible for fictive motion sentences since by definition
(Talmy, 2000) this type of sentence uses motion verbs conveying
a change of space along a path or a change of location. Previous
studies (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg et al., 2008)
found that effector congruency produced facilitation in response
times. Since in this study we used leg-related action verbs,
foot responses should be faster than hand responses. However,
Boulenger et al. (2006; see also Buccino et al., 2005) recently
reported that language appears to interfere with the motor sys-
tem. Interference would occur particularly when sensorimotor
and linguistic information are difficult to integrate and/or are
temporally overlapping. So the exact direction of the effec-
tor congruency effect (facilitation vs. interference) is still under
scrutiny.
The task of judging whether a sentence meaning is sensible
or not responding with action-congruent vs. incongruent effec-
tors is widely used in the Embodied cognition literature (for a
review, see Fischer and Zwaan, 2008) since this task is considered
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as particularly apt to detect motor system activation (Fischer and
Zwaan, 2008). This task has the advantage that it leaves full time
to participants for processing the sentential meaning as com-
pared to our 2011 TMS study where brain stimulation occurred
just at the end of the sentence. Comprehension unfolds in time,
hence dividing the sentence into three fragments (NP, verb, sen-
tence completion), presented one at a time for a given lag, as
in our TMS study, may have required subjects to recompute the
sentence meaning assigned after the second fragment when the
arrival of the final segment made clear that the sentence was non-
literal. It is well-known that recomputing a sentential meaning
requires time and resources. Hence presenting the entire sen-
tence has the advantage to eliminate the need of recomputing the
non-literal meaning at the end of the sentence. Then, if motor
activation requires more time to emerge in idiomatic motion sen-
tences, due tomeaning reinterpretation processes and to the more
demanding nature of idiom understanding (Boulenger et al.,
2012), leaving more time to participants, as it is the case with the
sentence sensibility task, may led to motor activation not only in
literal, fictive and metaphorical motion sentences, as in our TMS
study, but also in idiomatic sentences.
EXPERIMENT
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We used the same controlled experimental materials of Cacciari
et al. (2011) adding a motor and a mental verb to the list to have
an equal number of stimuli per condition. This led to twenty-
eight familiar Italian verbs expressing a leg-related movement
(e.g., run, walk, escape, cross, go). The effector congruency of the
motion verbs was tested in the norming phase of Cacciari et al.
(2010) by asking five subjects to determine the effector mainly
used to perform the action conveyed by each verb. There were
four types of sentence for each of the 28 motion verb: (1) Literal
motion sentences (e.g., The man runs in the beautiful country);
(2) Metaphorical motion sentences (e.g., The woman runs with
her fantasy often); (3) Idiomatic motion sentences (e.g., Between
the neighbors runs bad blood); (4) Fictive motion sentences (e.g.,
The road runs along the impetuous river). Twenty-eight sentences
of similar length and syntactic structure containing a mental verb
acted as control sentences (e.g., Cristina considers the idea very
interesting). This led to 140 experimental sentences (see Appendix
for examples). The five types of sentence had the same verbal
tense, they were all in a third-person form and had animate sen-
tential subjects (with the exception of fictive sentences and three
metaphorical sentences). One hundred and forty non-sensible
sentences of similar length and structure were also created (e.g.,
The fisherman shouts in a traffic light; He receives candles for a veg-
etable soup). The lack of a semantically well-formed meaning was
assessed asking 10 participants to judge whether the sentence had
or not a sensible meaning on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1: The
sentence is meaningless to 7: The sentence has a clear meaning)
(M = 1.33, SD = 0.89).
The psycholinguistic characteristics that are known to affect
comprehension latencies were controlled as well (see Table 1).
The Age of Acquisition and the written frequency (COLFIS;
Bertinetto et al., 2005) of each mental verb were matched to those
of the paired motion verb. A written booklet containing literal,
metaphorical, fictive, and idiomatic motion sentences was pre-
sented to 20 participants (different from those involved in the
experiment) who were asked to assign a concreteness rating to the
sentential meaning (from 0%: no concrete action at all, to 100%:
totally concrete action). Basically, literal sentences were judged as
conveying a concrete action (mean = 96.7%, SD = 4.0%) and
much less so (or barely so) the other types of sentence. An addi-
tional group of 20 subjects was asked to determine the extent
to which each sentence conveyed a literal or non-literal meaning
using a 7-point scale (from 1: Literal meaning, to 7: Non-literal
meaning). While the literalness of literal and mental sentences
did not differ, metaphorical, fictive, and idiomatic motion sen-
tences were judged as more figurative than mental sentences.
Metaphorical motion sentences were judged as more figurative
than fictive sentences but as figurative as idiomatic ones. In turn,
idiomatic motion sentences were considered more figurative than
fictive ones. A different group of 20 participants was asked to
rate the comprehensibility of the sentences on a 7-point scale
(from 1: Not at all comprehensible, to 7: Fully comprehensible).
All sentences were highly comprehensible (mean = 6.1, SD =
0.5, range = 5.7–6.7) with literal motion sentences slightly but
Table 1 | Mean concreteness, written frequency, comprehensibility of the sentences, familiarity and semantic transparency of the idioms.
Type of subject Literal Metaphorical Fictive Idiomatic Mental
Proper name NP Proper name NP Proper name NP Proper name NP Proper name NP
15 13 12 16 0 28 7 21 21 7
TYPE OF SENTENCE
Written frequency of the verb 236.7 (389) 211.7 (354)
Figurativeness 2.0 (0.4) 5.6 (0.3) 3.7 (0.4) 5.2 (0.3) 2.1 (0.5)
Number of words 7.4 (0.5) 7.5 (0.6) 7.5 (0.8) 7.6 (0.8) 7.4 (0.5)
Sentence concreteness 96.7% (4.0) 3.1% (5.8) 25.4% (17.2) 6.4% (9.9) –
Sentence comprehensibility 6.5 (0.6) 5.7 (0.8) 5.9 (0.6) 5.7 (0.7) 6.7 (0.4)
Semantic transparency – 4.4 (1.2) –
Idioms familiarity – 4.9 (0.3) –
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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significantly more comprehensible than metaphorical, fictive and
idiomatic ones but as comprehensible as mental sentences. The
mean comprehensibility of metaphorical, fictive, idiomatic and
mental sentences did not differ. Themean number of words in the
five sentence types was balanced (mean= 7.5, SD = 0.1, range=
7.4–7.6).
In sum, the sentences were balanced for length and constituent
words frequency and had high comprehensibility scores. We also
controlled how much the idiom meaning was known (idiom
familiarity), and howmuch the meaning of the idiom constituent
words contributed to the figurative meaning (semantic trans-
parency) (see Table 1). We asked 21 additional participants to
rate each idiom on two separate rating scales (from 1: Unfamiliar
idiom/Individual words do not contribute at all, to 7: Totally
familiar idiom/Individual words contribute very much). The
idioms were all familiar (mean = 4.9, SD = 0.34) and moder-
ately transparent (mean = 4.4, SD = 1.2) with a between-idiom
variability (range = 2.03–6.85) typical of this metalinguistic
judgment.
PARTICIPANTS
Forty eight students of the University of Modena-Reggio Emilia
(33 female; mean age = 25.1 years, SD = 4.2) volunteered to
participate. All were native speakers of Italian, had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and came from the same geograph-
ical area. None of the participants reported a history of prior
neurological disorder. All participants were informed of their
rights and gave written informed consent for participation in
the study. The research was carried out fulfilling ethical require-
ments in accordance with standard procedures at the University
of Modena-Reggio Emilia.
PROCEDURE
Participants were tested individually in a sound-attenuated room
and sat at a distance of approximately 65 cm from the com-
puter screen. The experimental instructions were presented on
the screen and then repeated by the experimenter after the train-
ing session. Each trial began with a fixation cross (+) in the
center of a computer screen. A spacebar press initiated the pre-
sentation of the sentence that was written in GENEVA BOLD
14 and appeared in the center of the screen. The sentences were
divided into four lists, each list contained seven sentences per
condition (literal, metaphorical, idiomatic, fictive motion, men-
tal sentences) using a different verb so that participants were
presented with each motion verb only in one experimental con-
dition. As commonly done in the figurative language processing
literature, but unfortunately often not in the Embodied lan-
guage literature, figurative motion sentences (i.e., idiomatic and
metaphorical) represented only 27% of sensible sentences to pre-
vent participants from developing specific processing strategies.
Fifty two meaningless sentences and 17 filler sentences with a
well-formed literal meaning (without any motion verb) were
added to the 35 experimental sentences forming each list so that
each participant was presented with an equal number of sensible
and non-sensible sentences.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four lists.
The sentences were presented in four different blocks that differed
as to the effector (hand finger vs. foot) with which partici-
pants were instructed to respond. The order of the blocks (e.g.,
Block 1: Hand response; Block 2: Foot response; Block 3; Hand
response; Block 4: Foot response) was changed every four partici-
pants. In the Hand blocks, participants were instructed to press
a YES button with their dominant finger as quickly and accu-
rately as possible when the sentence was sensible and aNO button
when the sentence was non-sensible. In the Foot blocks, partic-
ipants were instructed to press a YES button pedal with their
dominant foot as quickly and accurately as possible when the
sentence was sensible and a NO button pedal when the sentence
was non-sensible. The positions of the response buttons were
counterbalanced across participants. Participants judged the sen-
tence sensibility responding with the hand finger for half of the
sentences and with the foot for the remaining. Hand and foot
dominance were controlled using the Lateral Preference Inventory
(Coren, 1993). The left hand was dominant in three participants
and the left foot in three participants. A response deadline of
3000ms was employed. Before the experiment, each participant
performed 12 practice trials formed by sentences without any
motion verb, half with sensible and half with non-sensible mean-
ings. To be sure that participants knew the meaning of idiomatic
sentences, at the end of the experiment they were presented with
the list of idiomatic motion sentences and were asked to write
down the sentence meaning. A rating of 0 was assigned to the
answer I do not know or to a wrong meaning, 1 to a partially cor-
rect meaning and 2 to the correct meaning. The results (mean =
1.7, SD = 0.3, range = 1.3–2) suggest that participants indeed
knew the idiom meanings.
Stimulus presentation and response collection were performed
using a purpose-written E-Prime script (Psychology Software
Tools).
RESULTS
One participant was discarded due to low accuracy (55%).
The mean response times (RTs) to correct answers and the
accuracy proportions in the different conditions are plotted in
FIGURE 1 | Mean reaction times for responses emitted with hand (dark
gray bar) and foot (bright gray bar) effectors in literal, metaphorical,
idiomatic, fictive motion, and mental sentences.
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Figures 1 and 2. RTs exceeding ±2 SD were eliminated (2.1%).
The mean error rate was 2.8%. The RTs of correct responses
and the accuracy proportions were analyzed employing mixed-
effects models (Baayen et al., 2008). The dependent variable was
dichotomous in the accuracy analysis, hence a logistic model was
applied (Jaeger, 2008). Two factors were considered: Sentence
type (literal vs. metaphorical vs. idiomatic vs. fictive motion vs.
mental sentences) and Effector (hand vs. foot). Participant and
item were introduced as crossed random effects. Models were
tested using the lmer() function of the lme4 package of R, and
models comparisons were assessed using the anova() function
which calculates a Chi-square test for evaluating the difference
between models goodness of fit, following Baayen’s (2008) pro-
cedure. Finally, the F statistic and p value were obtained with the
anova() and the df() functions, respectively.
Effects were evaluated one by one on the basis of likelihood
ratio tests: those whose inclusion did not increase significantly
the goodness of fit of the model were removed from the analysis.
The final model on correct response times showed a main effect
of Sentence type (F = 7.08, p < 0.01), and a Sentence type ×
Effector interaction (F = 3.16, p < 0.02). Table 2 illustrates the
model parameters. As can be seen from the last-but-third line
FIGURE 2 | Mean percentage of correct responses emitted with hand
(dark gray bar) and foot (bright gray bar) effectors in literal,
metaphorical, idiomatic, fictive motion, and mental sentences.
in the Table, the interaction is motivated by the fact that foot
responses were quicker than hand responses, but only in lit-
eral motion sentences (1701ms vs. 1788ms, see also Figure 1).
The final model conducted on mean accuracy proportions only
showed a significant main effect of Sentence type (F = 20.99,
p < 0.0001).
We also considered whether some of the semantic charac-
teristics of our motion sentences, notably concreteness, figura-
tiveness (and idiom familiarity and semantic transparency for
idiomatic sentences), affected foot response times. Neither con-
creteness nor figurativeness ratings significantly correlate with the
foot response times of any of the motion sentence types. Idiom
familiarity and semantic transparency did not significantly cor-
relate with foot response times either (Pearson r values all below
statistical significance with α = 0.01).
DISCUSSION
Overall the present results suggest that motor activation is
detectable at the end of the sentence only when the sentence con-
veys a literal change of location. It should be recalled that in
Cacciari et al. (2011), the highest motor excitability (as reflected
by the largest MEPs) was recorded on literal motion sentences.
In contrast to our TMS study (Cacciari et al., 2011) on the same
experimental materials, we did not find any trace of motor acti-
vation in fictive and metaphorical motion sentences. In contrast
to our hypothesis, but as in Cacciari et al. (2011), we did not
find any motor activation for idiomatic sentences regardless of
the time left for responding and of the full sentence presentation
format.
We found that foot responses to literal motion sentences were
faster than hand responses. One might wonder whether this may
reflect the fact that in general foot responses are faster than hand
responses. However, if this was indeed the case, we should have
found faster foot responses in all sentence types. But this did
not occur: in fact, foot response times were even slightly longer
than hand responses in metaphorical motion and mental sen-
tences (27 and 11ms, respectively) and exactly as long as hand
response times in fictive motion sentences. This questions the
possibility that foot responses may be in general quicker than
hand responses. It should also be noted that studies using hand
vs. foot responses showed that typically hand responses are faster
than foot responses (e.g., Buccino et al., 2005).
Table 2 | Fixed effects in the final model on correct response times.
Fixed effects Estimate Std. error t-value p-value
Intercept 7.45 0.03 243.40 0.0001
Sentence type: idiomatic 0.05 0.03 1.61 0.11
Sentence type: literal 0.02 0.03 0.64 0.52
Sentence type: metaphorical 0.05 0.02 2.11 0.04
Sentence type: mental −0.03 0.03 −1.09 0.28
Effecton: foot 0.01 0.02 0.37 0.71
Effecton: foot × sentence type: idiomatic −0.01 0.02 −0.30 0.76
Effecton: foot × sentence type: literal −0.06 0.02 −2.74 0.006
Effecton: foot × sentence type: metaphorical 0.01 0.02 0.41 0.68
Effecton: foot × sentence type: mental 0.004 0.02 0.19 0.85
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Another possible concern is why some previous studies found
an effector congruency effect at the end of action-related con-
crete and abstract sentences (e.g., Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002)
and we find this effect only in literal motion sentences. Some
methodological differences may account for this inconsistency:
for instance, in Glenberg and Kaschak the sentences were shorter
than ours, had an abstract but literal meaning (or at least their
potential figurativeness was not controlled for). In our study the
literalness/figurativeness dimension was carefully controlled for
so that we had either literal or non-literal sentences but not a
mixed bag of stimuli. In fact, as noted in a recent review article by
Willems and Casasanto (2011), whether motor areas are activated
when participants understand non-literal uses of action-related
language has produced mixed results also because these studies
have tested a mixed bag of non-literal language: action metaphors,
action idioms and non-action verbs derived (diachronically) from
action verbs (p. 7). Then, the embodied literature mostly used
a go/no go variant of the sentence sensibility task instead of a
2-choice variant, as in the present study. Recent studies (e.g.,
Gomez et al., 2007) suggested that measuring response times
using go/no go vs. 2-choice variants of a task may produce dif-
ferent results due to different response criteria and/or decisional
processes at work in the two variants.
In sum, the present results suggest that the less literal was the
change of location conveyed by the sentences, the more motor
activation faded away as time passed such that, at the end of
the sentence, motor resonance was alive only in the strongest
case: sentences conveying an actual action performed by an ani-
mate agent. The results of our TMS study reflected the motor
excitability evoked by motion sentences while sentential process-
ing was still unfolding or had just finished. Although we know
from several studies (for overviews, see Glenberg and Kaschak,
2002; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008) that effector congruency effects
reflect the involvement of the motor system, at a purely behav-
ioral level this effect may register a less direct brain response to
action-related sentences than when motor excitability is directly
recorded with TMS (and at short lags, in our study) or MEG (for
a discussion, see Boulenger et al., 2012). In other words we can-
not exclude that motor activation indeed occurred at the verb in
all motion sentences (Zwaan and Taylor, 2006) and then decayed
as a function of the strength of the action-related meaning of the
sentence until being in most cases undetectable at the end of the
sentences.
The possibility that motor system become active at the verb
position for then decaying as a function of the strength of
the semantic motion component of the sentence is compatible
with the Linguistic Focus Hypothesis (Zwaan and Taylor, 2006).
According to this hypothesis, motor activation may be short-lived
at a sentential level in that it may not extend beyond action-
specifying verb. Hence, it may progressively fade away after the
verb for being undetectable when subjects emit the sensibility
judgment at the end of the sentence. The idea that motor acti-
vation may be short-lived is also consistent with previous studies,
for instance with the MEG study by Pulvermüller et al. (2005)
where it was shown a short-lived language induced motor activ-
ity at around 150ms. As Nazir et al. (2008) pointed out, it can be
the case that action words used in non-literal ways, as for instance
in The cash machine swallowed his credit card, may engage corti-
cal motor regions during lexical access for the word “swallow” but
probably not during subsequent access to the meaning implied by
the sentence (p. 940).
Non-literal motion sentences did not convey any actual action.
They represent a typical case of abstract meanings conveyed by
verbs that, in other linguistic contexts, may instead denote a con-
crete action. As Kousta et al. (2010) noted, it is not obvious how
an embodied account can be valid for abstract meanings. One
possibility is to presuppose that all non-literal motion sentences
originate from embodied conceptual metaphors (Gibbs, 2006).
However, it is still controversial whether conceptual metaphors
are indeed part of our online understanding of non-literal lan-
guage (for an extensive discussion, see Katz et al., 1998), how
they are acquired and mentally represented and whether they are
fundamental in the development (and representation) of abstract
concepts and word meanings (Kousta et al., 2010). Then, even
assuming that upon reading an idiomatic motion sentence one
activates the embodied simulation corresponding to the under-
lying conceptual metaphor (Gibbs, 2006), the processing mecha-
nism underlying such a univocal mapping are not yet spelled out.
For instance, let us take Italian idioms such as, for instance, scen-
dere dal pero (climb down the pear tree, i.e., abruptly discover the
truth), andare a monte (go to mount, i.e., fail) or venire alle mani
(come to the hands, i.e., fight). These are semantically opaque
idioms taken from the experimental stimuli of the present study.
How can we identify the corresponding underlying conceptual
metaphors and map them onto the specific sentential context?
In any case, if the semantic structure of the underlying concep-
tual metaphors (if any) had played any role in determining foot
response times, we should have found a significant correlation
between semantic transparency and response times, but this was
not the case.
What are the implications of the present results? First, they
showed that the engagement of the motor system in the seman-
tic processing of sentences with motion verbs is constrained by
the linguistic context in which the verb occurred. Of course, this
holds true if we assume that the behavioral task we employed
implies motor system activation, as previous studies showed (e.g.,
Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002). Our results confirm that motor
cortex did not respond to motor verbs indiscriminately repli-
cating part of the results previously observed in TMS studies
on the same experimental materials (Cacciari et al., 2010, 2011;
see also Willems and Casasanto, 2011 for further evidence). This
undermines the generality of the claim of a causal contribution
of motor activation to the semantic processing of motion sen-
tences. Our results also suggest the possibility that the more time
passed from the presentation of the motion verb, the more motor
activation faded away. Finally, our results favor the idea that for
comprehending abstract concepts (as those conveyed by non-
literal sentences) linguistic information is crucial and certainly
more relevant than sensory-based information. In fact, idiomatic
motion sentences were well-understood by participants despite
the fact that no motor activation occurred, as shown by both the
TMS and the present study. In sum, definitively the activation of
motor or sensory information may contribute to but definitively
not replace the semantic analysis of a sentence.
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APPENDIX
Italian examples of sensible sentences with word-by-word English
translations:
Literal motion: Claudia salta la corda in cortile (Carla jumps
the rope in the yard).
Metaphorical motion: Lo studente salta da un libro all’altro
(The student jumps from a book to another one).
Fictive motion: La ferrovia salta quel paese isolato (The trains
jumps the isolated village).
Idiomatic motion: Alice salta di palo in frasca sempre (Alice
jumps from pole to branch always).
Mental Verb: Il padrone garantisce un aumento di stipendio
(The owner guarantees an increase in the salary).
Literal motion: Guido esce dall’aula magna universitaria
(Guido goes out from the assembly hall).
Metaphorical motion: La signora esce dai pensieri del marito
(The lady goes out from the husband thoughts).
Fictive motion: La pista esce dal confine italiano (The trails goes
out from the Italian border).
Idiomatic motion: Il politico esce di scena velocemente (The
politician goes out from the scene quickly).
Mental Verb: Riccardo capisce la soluzione del quiz (Riccardo
understands the solution of the problem).
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